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PUBLIC REASON AS A PUBLIC GOOD
AARON-ANDREW P. BRUHL'
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary liberal theorists see value pluralism as a
permanent social fact, the natural and inevitable result of living under
free institutions.' It is, too, a normatively desirable circumstance, for
the diversity of values provides a broad range of options from which
each individual can choose a uniquely satisfying conception of the
good life.2 Yet this same pluralism can threaten the efficacy and the
authority of the state. Where can a government ground a legitimating
doctrine when its citizens endorse radically divergent systems of
meaning? How can political debate succeed when its participants find
different values controlling? More fundamentally, how does one
prevent irreconcilable value conflicts from exploding into violent civil
strife that ultimately leads to the disintegration of the pluralistic state
itself?
It often appears that we have tamed the threatening potential of
value pluralism, at least to the extent we are concerned only with our
own domestic politics, but that conclusion risks hubris and
shortsightedness. After all, two millennia of political philosophizing
generally taught that a society so divided cannot long endure, and even
here and now, apparently so settled in our peaceful liberal ways,
events such as bombings of abortion clinics occasionally demonstrate
* J.D., Yale Law School, 2003; M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 2000. I would
like to thank Dan Kahan and Daniel Markovits for helpful comments on earlier
drafts.
1. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xvi-xvii, xxiv-xxv, 36-37 (1993).
2. This thought is most closely identified with John Stuart Mill. See also JOSEPH
RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 398-99 (1986) ("Autonomy is exercised through
choice, and choice requires a variety of options to choose from . . . [V]aluing
autonomy leads to the endorsement of moral pluralism.").
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the power of value conflicts to break free of the confines of bloodless
liberal politics. Perhaps chastened by such events, the later work of
one of the leading English-speaking political philosophers turned to
grappling with the basic question of the liberal state's tenability: "How
is it possible," John Rawls asked, "that there may exist over time a
stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by
reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines? ' ' 3 Rawls is by no means alone in so framing the problem.
According to Bruce Ackerman, the fundamental liberal problematic is
captured in the question of "how people who disagree about the moral
truth might nonetheless reasonably solve their ongoing problem of
living together."
4
Rawls's solution draws to a great extent on notions of public
reason. As will be developed at greater length below,5 public reason
requires citizens (when acting in their political capacity) to forsake
potentially divisive appeals to inherently contestable theories of the
good life. Arguments rooted in public reason appeal instead to
common ground. They are accessible to all citizens for they appeal to
political values shared by all reasonable inhabitants of a liberal
democracy. Public reason does not express the whole truth as any
citizen sees it-for free people will never agree on the whole truth-
but it at least allows citizens to engage in reasoned debate about the
most appropriate means of securing outcomes the citizenry agrees are
worthwhile. Articulating the widely shared values that allegedly
undergird public reason-and demonstrating that this common ground
possesses sufficient content and specificity to generate non-trivial
answers to actual political problems-forms the heart of Rawls's
project.
A number of other leading contemporary political and legal
theorists also urge that citizens engaged in public political discourse
refrain from making arguments based on their private moral, spiritual,
3. RAWLS, supra note 1, at xviii; see also id at xxv, 3.
4. Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 8 (1989).
5. See infra Section I.B. 1.
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or aesthetic doctrines. Ackerman, for instance, requires that citizens
obey a principle of neutrality that bars appeals to their ideas of the
good life. The school of thought known as deliberative democracy
similarly requires that participants in public debate give reasons that
would have persuasive force for citizens with values unlike the
speaker's. Though the different approaches vary in some important
ways, they all require that citizens constrain their public dialogue in a
similar manner, and I shall generally refer to all of them as theories of
public reason.
Theories of public reason are prevalent, but is the ideal
practicable? Surely it is possible for citizens to speak in the register of
public reason some of the time, for we observe people doing so. The
current debate over whether a higher rate of gun ownership leads to
less rather than more crime 7 is an example of the operation of public
reason: The contending parties agree on the desirability of reducing
crime and accept the validity of scientific hypothesis testing, both of
which fall within the confines of public reason's accepted values and
methods.8 In many other cases, however, such as when citizens
6. The views mentioned in this paragraph are treated in greater depth infra at
Sections I.B.2-3.
7. Compare JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GuNs, LESS CRIME (1998) (arguing that
liberalized concealed weapons laws lead to lower rates of violent crime) with Ian
Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Nondiscretionary Concealed Weapons Laws: A Case
Study of Statistics, Standards of Proof and Public Policy, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
436 (1999) (questioning Lott's statistical analysis).
8. One could object that the gun debate is merely masquerading as a disagreement
over statistics when in fact it is actually a conflict over values-in particular over the
status of gun ownership as normal versus deviant. Cf Wendy Kaminar, Second
Thoughts on the Second Amendment, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1996, at 32
("Debates about gun ownership and gun control are driven more by values and
ideology than by pragmatism-and hardly at all by the existing empirical research,
which is complex and inconclusive.") Perhaps so, but this in no way makes the
debate any less paradigmatic an example of public reason. Even if an argument
based on public reason is often merely a proxy, conscious or not, for an underlying
clash of private reasons, speaking in the register of public reason still serves its goal
of reducing divisiveness in public discourse. It is unclear whether Rawls himself
would endorse such a reading of public reason, but he does say that citizens can
support a position because of their comprehensive doctrines, as long as they can also
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support (or condemn) capital punishment on the grounds that their
religion endorses (or forbids) it, political discourse evidently does not
obey the dictates of public reason.
Skeptical of public reason's grand ambitions of neutral public
discourse, and having witnessed its frequent failures, some
commentators have criticized it as unrealistic or impossible. 9 For how
can a person whose view on abortion, gun control, or capital
punishment really is wholly based on fervently felt religious or
cultural commitments be expected to express herself in the cool,
neutral terms of public reason? This isn't just a question about
whether the liberals' dialogic requirement is fair to such citizens-
though it very well might not be-but rather about whether it is even
psychologically possible always to separate oneself from one's
commitments in the way the ideal requires.
This article also expresses concerns about public reason, but
not on the grounds that the ideal is psychologically unrealistic.
Instead, my argument is that public reason is strategically
underdeveloped. Even assuming citizens of good faith, who are
motivated and able to engage in public reason, it might be irrational
for them to do so. The trouble is that public reason, no less than more
common examples like lighthouses or clean air, is what economists
recognize as a public good.' No individual can be excluded from the
benefits of a public sphere in which the ideal prevails, and so there is
justify it according to public reason. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited, 64 U. CHi. L. REv. 765, 783-87 (1997). For a discussion of deterrence and
other consequentialistic idioms as means of sublimating cultural conflict, see
generally Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REv.
413 (1999),
9. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
10. As suggested in passing by Kahan, supra note 8, at 488. Apart from this brief
reference, the point seems to have been neglected in the literature. Note that I am
assuming that citizens will be persuaded by the liberals' argument that a public
sphere regulated by norms of neutrality really is a public good rather than a bad. If
some citizens regard it as a bad, that further reduces public reason's strategic
prospects. Cf infra Section III.D. 1 (discussing the problem of zealotry).
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an incentive to free ride on the dialogic sacrifices of others. And if
most others are not heeding public reason, can liberals really expect
their followers unilaterally to disarm in the face of an opposition fully
willing to wage cultural war? From the perspective of the standard
theory of collective action, public reason presupposes either
irrationality or a taste for self-sacrifice.
Now, as those schooled in liberal political philosophy will be
quick to point out, theorists of public reason do not conceive of
persons as the one-dimensional rational egoists familiar from some
economic models. For Rawls, men are both rational and reasonable."
As reasonable, they possess a sense of justice. Reasonable persons
should pursue public reason not because it is to their selfish advantage
to do so (though, in the long run, it might be), but because public
reason is morally justified. Therefore, it cannot count as an argument
against public reason that honoring it can sometimes conflict with self-
interest. A crude rational choice critique is therefore inapposite.
Nonetheless, political philosophy cannot be insensitive to
strategic rationality. For even if the conventional theory of collective
action is crude, it too captures some of the truth about how citizens, as
both rational and reasonable, respond to the demands of public reason.
The public goods analysis can help provide an account of why public
reason often fails us, and it can generate modest prescriptions to
alleviate the problem. Most importantly, it can show how public
reason can fail even if most citizens are convinced by its proponents.
To say that public reason conflicts with strategic rationality is not to
assume that citizens should act on the basis of self-interest; it is just to
suggest that the theory of collective action might shed light upon why
public reason frequently fails us, as well as upon what might be done
about it. These are considerations that persons sympathetic to public
reason's aims-among whom I count myself-can ignore only to their
detriment.
Part I of this article lays the foundation for the later discussion
by explaining public reason and its purposes in more detail. While
Rawls is the primary exponent of public reason, I also address other
11. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 48-54.
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leading theorists, particularly Ackerman, who likewise urge citizens to
constrain their dialogue, for all of them are susceptible to the same
critique. Part II introduces a number of concepts from game theory
and the theory of collective action, which framework suggests that the
ideal of public reason is incompatible with a rational, strategically
aware citizenry. Part II also explores standard responses to public
goods situations, finding that the usual prescriptions offer little help.
Part III expounds an alternative theory of collective action, one based
on an empirically observed norm of reciprocity, that complicates
somewhat the uniformly pessimistic diagnosis of the standard view.
Yet, Part III in no way rescues public reason from all strategic worries.
On the contrary, public reason emerges as precarious and much more
complex than its adherents have supposed. In particular, the success
of public reason hinges upon citizens' perceptions of their fellow
citizens' intentions, which perceptions may be shaped largely by the
actions of a relative few people. Intended as a means of promoting
political stability, public reason is itself in fact highly unstable.
I. PUBLIC REASON AND ITS PROMISE
Dialogic accounts of justice have occupied a leading
position in recent political theorizing.12 Public reason is one such
account, and, as explained below, its key feature is that it envisions a
dialogue constrained in certain ways. This Part sets the stage for the
strategic critique of constrained dialogue by providing a brief
description of public reason, its task, and its promised benefits.
A. Illiberal discourse as the problem
From reading the Introduction to Rawls's Political
Liberalism, one can get the impression that sixteenth-century Europe's
wars of religion are still the enemy that political liberalism, and public
12. See MARK KINGWELL, A CIVIL ToNGUE 5-6 (1995) (noting the rise of such
accounts).
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reason more particularly, is supposed to be combating. While it is true
that the horror of that age did much to illustrate the necessity of
religious tolerance, and thereby spark the development of liberalism,
religiously motivated bloodshed is not public reason's sole, or even
primary, target. Rather, in contemporary politics, the main antagonist
in the public reason story is rival status groups' struggle over the
expressive power of the law. If one is to understand the magnitude of
the task that public reason confronts, it is useful to have at least a brief
overview of the problem.
The recent work of Richard McAdams, one of the
leading figures in the law-and-norms movement, has attempted to
explain why ideological groups care so deeply about which set of
contending social norms the law shall endorse.' 3 McAdams begins
with the assumption that individuals seek the esteem and approval of
others, which leads them to try to conform their behavior to
community norms. 14  Yet people can be mistaken about approval
patterns, and norms are often ambiguous.1 5  Legislation, however,
serves as a reliable signal of what behavior is approved or valued, and,
since individuals seek social approval, valorizing a norm through the
law will therefore influence behavior.' 6  This provides a ready
explanation for why people care so deeply about political
pronouncements in areas where norms are contested. "Because
government expression influences behavior, we can more easily
13. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L.
REV. 339 (2001) [hereinafter Adams, Expressive Law]; see also Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv.
338 (1997) [hereinafter Adams, Norms]. Status, esteem, and related notions are
relative newcomers to legal scholarship, but in other disciplines they have long and
detailed histories that the narrow analysis offered here does not attempt to capture.
14. McAdams, Expressive Law, supra note 13, at 343-49; McAdams, Norms, supra
note 13, at 358-75.
15. McAdams, Expressive Law, supra note 13, at 349-58.
16. Id. at 358-72.
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understand why ideological interest groups invest so heavily in
capturing and exploiting the expressive power of the state.' 7
McAdams perhaps overstates the extent to which participants
in expressive contests are interested in influencing others' behavior,
but people still have ample reason to compete for the law's
endorsement of their values regardless of any behavior-shaping
impact. For when the state takes a position on a matter of social
dissensus, it elevates the social status-that is, the prestige and honor
that an individual or group enjoys-of those who identify with the
system of values or way of life the law has endorsed. 18 Status groups
therefore compete vigorously to win political affirmation, both
because status is a valuable good and because, as Jack Balkin
describes it, status is "non-Paretian"--one cannot increase the status of
one group without decreasing that of another.' 9
Many heated political debates can be understood through the
lens of status competition. Balkin's leading example is Colorado's
Amendment 2, which he describes as an effort to reassert traditional
values that confer higher social status on heterosexuals than
homosexuals.2 ° In a similar vein, the political sociologist Joseph
Gusfield's study of the Temperance movement casts it as an attempt
on the part of traditional rural Protestants to maintain their social
prestige against threats from a rising urban and largely immigrant
working class. 21 Even if prohibition laws did little to affect the actual
behavior of drinkers, "[t]he public support of one conception of
morality at the expense of another enhances the prestige and self-
17. Id. at 378; see also id at 381-82 (emphasizing the role of symbolic government
actions in influencing behavior).
18. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 (1997).
19. Id. at 2327-29.
20. Id. at 2335-36.
21. JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1986).
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esteem of the victors and degrades the culture of the losers., 22 The
abortion struggle too, while obviously concerned with regulating
behavior, can also be viewed as status competition between groups
with divergent conceptions of the social role of women.
23
Status politics and cultural battles of the sort just canvassed
exemplify the kinds of public discourse that, as we will see below, the
ideal of public reason is intended to combat. The forces that push
status conflicts into the law are deeply rooted and, when compared to
conflicts over economic resources, highly resistant to compromise or
moderation.24 When evaluating the prospects of public reason, one
must keep in mind the magnitude of the dialogic sacrifices it asks
citizens to make.
B. Public reason as the solution
Having sketched the task that public reason confronts, the
following sections now elaborate upon the liberal ideal of
appropriately constrained public discourse. The explication focuses
on the work of John Rawls and Bruce Ackerman, then concludes by
explaining the shared features of various liberal accounts that make
them all similarly susceptible to the strategic critique developed in Part
II.
22. Id. at 4-5.
23. See generally KRISTEN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD
(1984). Similarly, while hate crimes legislation is meant to have an impact on
behavior, it also makes a profound statement about the relative status of traditionally
subordinated groups. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic
Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227
(2000).
24. GUSFIELD, supra note 21, at 177-78, 183-85; NANCY L. ROSENBLUM,
MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS 338-39 (1998) ("Political compromises are intolerable if
they are seen as compromises of who we are rather than as efforts to secure for
members their share, fair or not, of jobs and positions, opportunities and
influence.").
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1. Rawls
As indicated earlier, Rawls sees his recent work as an attempt
to vindicate the possibility of a stable and non-repressive state, given a
citizenry deeply and abidingly divided over questions of ultimate
value. Public reason is of course one of the centerpieces of his project,
but to understand its role one has to appreciate the important
distinction between comprehensive doctrines on the one hand and a
political conception of justice on the other.
Comprehensive doctrines are overall conceptions of the good
life, and as such they touch many facets of one's existence. An
experimental liberalism of the sort expounded by John Stuart Mill is a
comprehensive view, as is evangelical Christianity, and so again are
Nietzscheanism, full Kantianism, and Buddhism. Different
comprehensive doctrines will disagree on any number of questions,
and, as between contending doctrines, these conflicts can be
irreconcilable. The Christian and the Nietzschean simply cannot come
to an agreement, qua affirmers of their comprehensive views, on the
attitude one should take toward the downtrodden. Any politics
requiring such agreement, therefore, is doomed to strife or oppression.
But while reasonable persons cannot reach agreement on many
questions of tremendous philosophical and moral importance, Rawls
believes that they can find shared political propositions that all of
them, as citizens, can affirm. That is, notwithstanding the great
diversity of comprehensive views that free citizens may endorse, one
can find within the culture of a democratic regime what Rawls calls an
"overlapping consensus" that supports the principles of a political (not
a comprehensive) liberalism. 26  This shared political conception of
25. On the difference between the two, see especially RAWLS, supra note 1, at 11-15,
174-76. For accessible expositions of Rawls's views on public reason and related
concepts, see Charles Larmore, Public Reason, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
RAWLS 368 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003); and Samuel Freeman, Introduction, in id
at 1, 28-44.
26. See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 133-72. It is a hugely important question whether
there can actually be any shared political conception sufficiently detailed to provide
solutions to contentious matters such as abortion and affirmative action. It is Rawls's
burden to provide that demonstration, and it is for him to defend his particular
226 [Vol.4:217
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justice stands separate from any particular comprehensive doctrine,
and it does not claim to speak to the multitude of questions those
doctrines must address.27 In deliberating about broad questions of
how one ought to live a good life, a person may surely appeal to the
reasons provided by her comprehensive doctrine, reasons that may be
persuasive only to others who share it. But when a polity deliberates
about matters within its limited range of authority, citizens must not
rely on disputed values and modes of reasoning given by their
comprehensive doctrines.28 Instead, they can only appeal to reasons
and methods cognizable within the polity's shared public conception
of political justice. This kind of debate, constrained by the
requirement of arguing from a polity's shared political values, is the
exercise of public reason.29 As Rawls sums up this point:
Citizens realize that they cannot reach agreement or even approach
mutual understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable
comprehensive doctrines. In view of this, they need to consider
what kinds of reasons they may reasonably give one another when
fundamental political questions are at stake. I propose that in
public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be replaced
by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as
citizens.
30
conception of justice as the true content of our shared political consensus. The
analysis developed here will assume that Rawls is able show the existence of a
shared set of public values to which citizens are supposed to appeal in the practice of
public reason
27. Id. at 11-13. In later work Rawls allows the possibility of there existing a family
of related liberal political conceptions that would satisfy his requirements, not only a
single such conception. See RAWLS, supra note 8, at 773-74.
28. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 224-35.
29. Id. at 213.
30. Rawls, supra note 8, at 766.
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The duty of public reason applies to all public debate over
questions of basic justice.3' It applies to ordinary citizens engaged in
public advocacy and voting, to candidates and parties in devising their
platforms and making speeches, to legislators debating laws, to public
pronouncements of the executive, and, most centrally, it applies to
32judicial opinions. Public reason ought to be exemplified by the
reasoning of a constitutional court.33 We would think it illegitimate if
the majority of the Supreme Court based its decisions on the revealed
word of God, or even on its reading of Sartre.34 Instead, we expect
them to appeal to publicly accessible constitutional precepts. Ordinary
citizens engaged in voting or public debate bear this same duty
because, in a democratic society, they too exercise the coercive power
of the state.
35
Rawls devotes relatively little attention to how the ideal of
public reason would play out in actual public debates. He does,
however, briefly discuss it in relation to the controversy over same-sex
31. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 214-15.
32. Id. at 215-16. Although public reason applies to all of these actors, my critique
questions the prospects for compliance by ordinary citizens. With respect to parties
and public officials, in contrast, compliance with public reason is much less
strategically problematic. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
33. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 231; see also id at 254 ("To check whether we are
following public reason we might ask: how would our argument strike us presented
in the form of a supreme court opinion?").
34. "The justices cannot, of course, invoke their own personal morality, nor the
ideals and virtues of morality generally. Those they must view as irrelevant. Equally,
they cannot invoke their or other people's religious or philosophical views." Id. at
236. As a matter of description of current practice, Rawls surely goes too far. While
justices do not (openly, anyway) appeal to their own personal moral and religious
views, what they perceive as the cultural majority's moral and religious precepts
appear to be acceptable sources of constitutional law. See infra note 102 and
accompanying text.
35. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 217-18 (emphasizing that the duty of public reason does
not apply only to public acts of state officials).
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marriage. A position limiting marriage to combinations of one man
and one woman would, he thinks, almost certainly draw on
contentious notions of human flourishing provided by some
comprehensive view, religious or otherwise. In public reason, one
cannot rely on such arguments. One can, however, defend (or
condemn) the traditional male-female couple by using political values
such as equal citizenship and the social interest in raising and
educating children.
In the example just given, the arguments most obviously
excluded by the strictures of public reason would be religious
condemnations of homosexuality. Yet Rawls is at pains to emphasize
that public reason is not the same thing as secularism. Public reason
excludes appeals to all forms of comprehensive doctrine, whether
religious or humanist.37 Public reason would thus exclude, for
example, contentious Aristotelian or Social Darwinist arguments in
favor of limiting marriage to heterosexual couples. (Contrary to
Rawls's protestations, it might be true that public reason stacks the
deck in favor of secular comprehensive doctrines, but it is not my task
here to explore that objection.)
Confining one's public speech to the domain of shared political
values requires significant forbearance on the part of citizens.
Namely, it requires them to forgo appeals to what they see as the
whole truth and to refrain from relying upon the most deeply held
reasons for their positions.38 Surely this will often prove burdensome.
Why should citizens bear this cost?
36. See Rawls, supra note 8, at 779.
37. Id. at 775-76, 779-80.
38. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 216, 241-43. In later work, Rawls says that public
reason does not bar the introduction of comprehensive doctrines in public debate. It
still requires, however, that citizens also provide public reasons sufficient to support
the position dictated by their comprehensive doctrine. Rawls, supra note 8, at 783-
87; see also Larmore, supra note 25, at 385-86 (discussing-and criticizing--the
relaxed version of public reason). This requirement to give public reasons is still
taxing. Moreover, it still bars positions given by one's comprehensive doctrine that
cannot be supported by public reasons.
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Rawls answers with the promise of legitimacy: The exercise of
the coercive power of the state is legitimate only when exercised in
accordance with a political structure justifiable according to reasons
that all citizens might reasonably affirm.39 Political power vindicated
through public reason, precisely because based upon considerations all
can accept, will therefore be legitimate. Public reason, then, offers an
escape from the oppressive politics that has dominated human history.
A public sphere governed by public reason offers advantages to all
citizens, whatever their substantive political commitments, so long as
they are at least minimally committed to constitutional democracy.
2. Ackerman
As we have seen, the idea of public reason is a key component
of Rawls's demonstration of the possibility of political liberalism.
Bruce Ackerman goes even further, contending that "the notion of
constrained conversation should serve as the organizing principle of
liberal thought." 40 For Ackerman, questions of justice are implicated
whenever one citizen claims some form of power over a fellow citizen,
and all legitimate assertions of power must be justified through
dialogue using the right kinds of reasons.41  His constraint on
permissible reasons takes the form of a stringent principle of neutrality
that governs all public discussions and decisions in a liberal state.
Neutrality bars any citizen from grounding a public justification of
power on a claim that his conception of the good is better than any
other citizen's or that he is intrinsically superior to his comrades. 42 As
explained in Section I.A, precisely such assertions of the superiority of
a group and its values are implicit, or even explicit, in many public
debates, including those involving welfare, abortion, and same-sex
marriage.
39. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 217, 243.
40. BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10 (1980).
41. Id. at 4-10.
42. Id at 11, 43-44.
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Ackerman is largely concerned with describing liberal justice
under ideal conditions, but his requirement of constrained dialogue
arguably plays an even greater role in his explication of second-best
theory. In second-best theory, as Ackerman defines it,43 we lack a
perfect technology of justice that permits the honest, instant, and
costless implementation of whatever result our neutral dialogue shows
is required. Since implementation is imperfect, injustices must be
prioritized for remediation; given the imperfect state of empirical
science, perhaps not every deviation from the ideal will even be
identified. Where ideal theory always arrived at a uniquely just
answer, second-best debate will instead leave room for good-faith
disagreement about how to proceed. 4  The citizens' freedom
reasonably to disagree about policy provides a cover under which to
introduce contestable conceptions of the good life into public debate,
and so it is in the more familiar second-best world that the constraints
of neutrality are most critical.
Ackerman concedes that observing the constraints of neutral
dialogue requires citizens to make a real sacrifice. "Doubtless the
exercise of conversational constraint will prove extremely frustrating,"
he writes, "for it will prevent each of us from justifying our political
actions by appealing to many of the things we hold to be among the
deepest and most revealing truths known to humanity., 45 Nonetheless,
we the citizens of Ackerman's liberal state are supposed to recognize
that "our mutual act of conversational restraint allows all of us to win
a priceless advantage"-namely that no member of the polity will be
forced to endorse any proposition about the moral truth that he
43. See id. at 232, 234-35.
44. Id. at 231-34, 273-77.
45. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 16-17; see also id. at 19-20 ("I am asking [citizens]
to make a special kind of emotional sacrifice .... [E]ach must try to repress their
desire to say many things which they believe are true, but which will divert the
group's energy away from the elaboration of the pragmatic implications of the [set of
shared moral propositions]."). Neutrality also requires citizens to forsake the
political advantages that might be won by unrestrainedly attempting to impose a
conception of the good on fellow citizens. ACKERMAN, supra note 40, at 371.
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46believes false. Additionally, one might also embrace neutrality
because of skepticism about transcendent truth, because one is
confident about the truth but equally confident in the value of finding
one's own way to it, or due to the rational fear of suffering oppression
at the hands of those who claim a contrary insight into the good.47
Ultimately, too, there is "the supreme pragmatic imperative": Finding
themselves divided by irreconcilable views of the moral truth, citizens
will have to accept the constraints of neutrality in order to get along
and get anything done.48
Whichever reasons motivate people to accept it, Ackerman
believes that non-coerced adherence to the constraints of neutral
dialogue can reasonably be expected of citizens. 49 Whether we can
reasonably expect such voluntary restraint, even to secure what we
concededly regard as a "priceless advantage," is a central concern of
this article.
3. Other theorists, common themes
Rawls and Ackerman are two of the most prominent and
systematic exponents of doctrines of constrained public discourse, but
they are certainly not the only ones.5° The political theorist Stephen
46. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 17.
47. ACKERMAN, supra note 40, at 10-12, 359-69.
48. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 10.
49. ACKERMAN, supra note 40, at 232; Ackerman, supra note 4, at 20-21; see also
KINGWELL, supra note 12, at 56 (emphasizing the voluntary nature of compliance).
50. For another recent example, see KINGWELL, supra note 12. Charles Larmore
similarly supports norms of conversational constraint and retreat from contested
views of the good life, though his treatment of the subject is much less extensive.
See CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 53-55 (1987). JOrgen
Habermas is probably the world's most prominent dialogic theorist, but I do not
specifically include him in the argument here because he claims that his theory does
not constrain debate in the way theorists of public reason demand. See JURGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 107-08, 308-09 (William Rehg trans., 1996). But
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Holmes has asserted that conversational constraint is a long-standing
feature of the liberal tradition. 51 Indeed, one finds such requirements
even in the work of those critics who explicitly disavow
conversational constraints. Amy Guttman and Dennis Thompson,
representatives of the school known as deliberative democracy, claim
that the public debate they envision does not prevent a person from
going to the contested moral truth of the matter,5 2 yet the central
requirement of their theory is that citizens "appeal to reasons that are
shared or could come to be shared by our fellow citizens,, 53 a
requirement apparently very close to Rawls's. Similarly, Kent
Greenawalt, who criticizes Rawls for requiring religious citizens to
distance themselves from their faith when speaking in public, in fact
concedes that religious people should speak in "publicly accessible
terms" when addressing those who do not share their beliefs.
54
The various theories of liberal dialogue canvassed in this part
of the article differ in their formulations, but for my purposes the
important thing is what they have in common. All of them ask citizens
to restrain their public political speech and refrain from invoking
contentious notions of the good life. If citizens agree not to make the
see Michael Walzer, A Critique of Philosophical Conversation, 21 PHIL. FORUM
182, 186 (1989) (questioning whether Habermasian discourse is actually
unconstrained).
51. See STEPHEN HOLMES, Gag Rules, or the Politics of Omission, in PASSIONS AND
CONSTRAINT (1995). Holmes's notion of gag rules can be distinguished from the
doctrines under discussion here in that gag rules, as Holmes describes them, act to
block discussion of particular topics, as opposed to restricting the range of
permissible reasons. See KINGWELL, supra note 12, at 75; Ackerman, supra note 4,
at 17-18. Gag rules are equally susceptible to the criticism developed in this article,
however.
52. AMY GUTTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 371
n.68 (1996).
53. Id. at 14.
54. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 155-56,
216-17 (1988).
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law into a battleground for cultural supremacy, they are promised the
benefits of civil tranquility, political legitimacy, psychic peace, and so
forth. These are valuable things, perhaps well worth the cost, but, as
explained in what follows, that is by no means sufficient to guarantee
public reason's triumph.
H. THE STRATEGY OF PUBLIC REASON
Ideals of public reason and constrained conversation can and
have been criticized on a number of grounds. It might be the case that
confining public debate to mutually acceptable premises simply
entrenches and reifies the power of culturally dominant groups,
silencing the voices of dissenters by ruling their views out of order.
55
It could also be true that supposedly neutral dialogue in fact
systematically disadvantages or trivializes certain conceptions of the
good, such as those that rely on deeply felt spiritual convictions.56 But
then if public reason were capacious enough to be fair to such views,
its content might be too generalized to provide us with any real
answers. 57 And, of course, many postmodem critics would insist that
neutrality and impartiality are mere illusions.58
55. See KINGWELL, supra note 12, at 48 ("[For most of human history,
conversational restraint has been used as a means of preventing the subordinate
group from gaining a voice in the conversation . . ."); see also Seyla Benhabib,
Liberal Dialogue vs. a Critical Theory of Discursive Legitimation, in LIBERALISM
AND THE MORAL LIFE (Nancy Rosenblum, ed. 1989); cf Thomas Kochman, The
Politics of Politeness: Social Warrants in Mainstream American Public Etiquette, in
MEANING, FORM, AND USE IN CONTEXT: LINGUISTIC APPLICATIONS 200-201, 208
(Deborah Schiffrin, ed. 1984) (arguing that norms of politeness benefit mainstream
authorities).
56. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 44-56, 213-32
(1993); John A. Coleman, Public Religion and Religion in Public, 36 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 279, 298-304 (2001).
57. See GREENAWALT, supra note 54, at 183-87. Even Larmore, who is sympathetic
to the ideal of neutrality, fears that it could be "too empty to generate any substantive
political principles." LARMORE, supra note 50, at 67.
58. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 102-
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A type of criticism somewhat more relevant to the argument of
this article takes a rather different tack. Instead of questioning the
desirability and defensibility of public reason as a normative ideal,
some critics challenge its possibility. When public reason (and
liberalism more generally) asks people to separate themselves from
their deeply held commitments, one argument runs, it asks more than
citizens can give.59 Citizens are, on this view, constituted by their
commitments and values, and so asking them to speak in the register
of public reason is like asking them to speak in a strange foreign
tongue. In the same vein, Kent Greenawalt, in a discussion focusing
on religious belief, points to the severe "psychological impediments"
that confront a person's attempt to separate his public from nonpublic
reasons for a 6Fosition, concluding that the task is "unrealistic" and
"impossible."
The central concern explored here is similar in that it also
concludes that public reason might ask too much of individuals.
However, instead of locating the problem in an alleged psychic
impossibility, here the problem is public reason's clash with strategic
rationality.
A. Public reason as a (behavioral) public good
1. The basic analysis
For purposes of argument, assume first that a public sphere in
which the norms of public reason prevail is universally preferred to
one in which citizens regularly make divisive appeals to private
values.6' Second, however, recall too that public reason is a genuine
07 (1990).
59. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1-65
(2d ed. 1998).
60. GREENAWALT, supra note 54, at 153-55.
61. Now it might be that some citizens do not in fact share this preference. As we
have seen, it might be an unfair ideal. Or perhaps some citizens-call them zealots-
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constraint-that is, it requires citizens to do something they might
otherwise not do: There are times when the atheist will not want to (or
not be able to) give publicly defensible reasons for his campaign to
abolish private religious schools, or when the fundamentalist will
prefer to give a biblical condemnation of same-sex marriage. Public
reason requires that these citizens find a publicly accessible
explanation for their programs or else abandon their positions. This is
a real sacrifice. We nonetheless assume, however, that citizens prefer
that public reason, rather than private assertion, controls the public
sphere. People are willing to pay the price for public reason, in other
words. They may do so because they think public reason is justified,
or because they at least find it an advantageous modus vivendi.
One might think that our charitable assumption of the
preferability of public reason would be enough to ensure its triumph.
We are assuming, after all, that citizens believe public reason is worth
its cost. For those familiar with the logic of game theory and
collective action, however, it is clear that citizens' desire for public
reason is by no means sufficient to ensure that public reason will
prevail.
The problem is that public reason appears to be what
economists term a public good. A paradigmatic form of market
failure, public goods are typified by goods like national defense, radio
broadcasts, and law and order. Such goods possess two features that
distinguish them from private goods like cars and books.6 2 First, such
goods exhibit nonrivalry, also called jointness of supply.63 That is,
simply enjoy strife, or at any rate are willing to risk it for the sake of forcing their
values on the polity. For now, however, we are giving public reason the benefit of
the doubt by ignoring such problems. I take up the problem of zealotry later. See
infra Section III.D. 1.
62. For discussions of the characteristics of public goods, see, e.g., RICHARD
CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND
CLUB GOODS 6-7 (1986); WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS
AND ITS APPLICATIONS 510-12 (7th ed. 1997). The seminal modem discussion of
public goods is Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
63. Nonrivalry and jointness of supply (as well as the related concept of
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once a radio program has been broadcast or a nuclear deterrent
established, an additional person can enjoy the good at no additional
cost and without reducing the amount available to others. In the same
way, the addition of one more citizen does not reduce the benefits of a
public sphere governed by public reason.
The second, and much more important, feature of public goods
is that they are nonexclusive; they provide benefits that no one can be
prevented from enjoying. Those who do not pay can easily be
excluded from a showing of a film, but they cannot readily be
excluded from military protection or mosquito control programs. In
the same way, absent exile or imprisonment, nobody can be excluded
from the public sphere. Everyone enjoys the advantages of a climate
in which citizens generally vindicate their normative political claims
through constrained discourse, even those who do not constrain
themselves.
The proponents of public reason argue that it is a most valuable
thing. Ackerman called it "a priceless advantage." Nonetheless, even
when every member of a large group wants a public good,
nonexclusivity dictates a depressing logic of collective failure. 65 If
others are willing to pay for public television or volunteer to clean up
the beach, I should not contribute, for I will benefit from those
activities anyway. If others do not pay, then once more I should not
nondepletability) are not strictly synonymous, see MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE
POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 7 (1987), but the slight differences are not important
here.
64. There is nothing inherent in a good that makes it exclusive or not; rather,
excludability depends on technology and social organization, both of which can
change over time. Radio broadcasts have traditionally been nonexclusive in that
anyone with a radio could hear them. But signals can also be scrambled, accessible
only to those who pay a user fee. Even quintessential public goods like sidewalks
could conceivably be closed to all but those who pay for them, but the cost of
exclusion is prohibitive, at least for now.
65. The classic exposition is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1965); cf Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
The basic insight is routinely cited in any microeconomics text. See, e.g.,
NICHOLSON, supra note 62, at 515-16.
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contribute, because my contribution will not bring appreciable benefits
66to me. Regardless of what others do, the rational person should
withhold cooperation. 67  "[E]ven if all of the individuals in a large
group are rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group,
they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still
not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest. 68
Provision of a public good, it is widely agreed, can therefore be had
only through compulsion.69
It is relatively straightforward to see how this same dynamic
can play out in the context of public reason. A climate of public
reason exists when most citizens, most of the time, follow the dictates
of neutrality. If others are providing a climate of peaceful and
legitimate discourse by restraining their particularistic appeals, and
since they cannot prevent me from enjoying the benefits of such a
public sphere, I could stubbornly continue to advance impermissible
arguments. And if others are engaged in a battle for the expressive
capital of the law, then wouldn't I be irrational-either a fool or an
altruist-to restrain myself unilaterally?
70
66. The statements in the text are true enough for present purposes, but there are
qualifications. For example, if a public good is produced in discontinuous chunks,
and my contribution is the critical factor in bringing the next chunk into existence,
then the private benefit of contributing might exceed the private cost. See infra notes
80-81 and accompanying text.
67. Noncooperation is therefore, in the language of game theory, a dominant
strategy: It is the optimal choice regardless of what others do. The classic logic of
collective action problems is in fact analogous to the problem presented by the well-
known prisoner's dilemma game. See RusSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 25-28
(1982) (demonstrating the equivalence). In both cases, the equilibrium solution is
noncooperation, even though the cooperative outcome would make each player
better off.
68. OLSON, supra note 65, at 2.
69. NICHOLSON, supra note 62, at 516 ("[Tlhe free rider problem can be solved only
by some sort of compulsion."); OLSON, supra note 65, at 2, 44.
70. Rawls requires citizens to be reasonable as well as rational, but he should not be
taken to require pure altruism in such a situation. See infra notes 92-96 and
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It is true that public reason differs from more familiar public
goods such as bridges and lighthouses for the obvious reason that
public reason is not a material object. Rather, it is more properly
thought of as a norm of public behavior. But this in no way means it
does not share the interactional structure of a public good. Indeed, the
public good paradigm is very well suited to the study of social
norms.7 1 "[A] social norm can be thought of as a sort of behavioral
public good, in which everybody should make a positive
contribution-that is, follow the social norm-and also where
individuals must be willing to enforce the social norm with informal
social sanctions, even at some immediate cost to themselves. '' 72 In
this way public reason is much like the behavioral public good of
public order (as opposed to the related, but distinct, material public
good of a police force). It does no good for advocates of public reason
to resist the public goods analysis simply by saying that public reason
is a normative requirement, something people are supposed to do.
Philosophers like Rawls and Ackerman do not propose to fund roads
by simply asserting the rectitude of voluntarily mailing in a fair
contribution. 73 On the contrary, they attend to micro-level dynamics,
and these are common across various forms of public goods.
One should not take anything in the preceding paragraphs to
mean that the conventional theory predicts that public goods will never
be provided to any degree, for it is not true that rational agents, even in
accompanying text.
71. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gdchter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 159, 166 (2000) ("[W]e believe that the
analytical structure of the public good problem is a good approximation to the
question of how social norms are established and maintained.").
72. Id
73. See, e.g, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 267 (1971) ("[A]rranging for and
financing public goods must be taken over by the state and some binding rule
requiring payment must be enforced.").
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large groups, should never voluntarily contribute anything to the
provision of public goods. Even the most self-interested citizens
might sometimes pay taxes even if there were no IRS special agents, if
only to signal to others that they are honest and conscientious-and
therefore attractive candidates for high-payoff long-term undertakings
in contexts where it is difficult to monitor behavior.74 And, of course,
a person living near a stagnant pond or dirty river might very well
engage in some mosquito control or water purification just for the sake
of the private benefits accruing therefrom. The key point is simply
that the level of public good-creating activity will be less than the
socially optimal level. The explanation is that the rational agent will
engage in the activity only to the extent that the private benefit
exceeds the private cost. But the overall social benefits of water
purification or taxpaying or other public good-creating activities are
greater than the benefit realized by the individual contributor. Since
these external benefits cannot be captured by the individual, her
privately optimal level of contribution is lower than the social
optimum. None of this is at all controversial within rational choice
theory, economics, or indeed mainstream liberal political theory. The
point here is that voluntarily contributing to public reason makes no
more (and no less) sense than voluntarily contributing to other, more
familiar public goods. The mere fact that we observe some amount of
compliance with its constraints in no way shows that the public goods
pathologies are not present.
2. Defining the public good more precisely
While all public goods have the properties of nonrivalry and
(more importantly) nonexclusivity, they vary along other dimensions.
These differences can make a strategic difference, with some types of
public goods having greater prospects of voluntary provision than
others.
74. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86
VA. L. REv. 1781, 1786-91 (2000).
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First, public goods vary along the dimension of jointness of
production.75 Some goods can be produced by one individual, or a
small group, acting alone. With sufficient resources and inclination,
one person could provide the public good of a lighthouse, a clean
beach, or a precedent-setting civil rights lawsuit, for example. In
contrast, a good is purely jointly produced if everyone must contribute
to it. Many public goods exhibit an intermediate degree of joint
production in that they require the cooperation of much, though not
all, of the relevant population. Boycotts, traffic decongestion, and
public order have this feature.
The fact that a certain public good could potentially be
provided by one person or small group acting alone should enhance its
prospects of provision, at least if such a highly interested person can
be found.76 At the same time, pure jointness of production might also
offer an advantage. If each person knows that her participation is
crucial to a valued good's continued provision, nobody has an
incentive to free ride.77
While recognizing that the question is somewhat speculative,
we might ask where public reason fits along the scale of jointness of
production. The nature of the good, recall, is that it obtains when
appropriately constrained dialogue is the dominant mode of public
justification. The public good of public reason therefore appears to be
partly jointly produced. The most devoted followers of Rawls could
not provide a general climate of public reason all by themselves, but
neither must every citizen always comply. Yet though a general
climate of public reason can prevail despite the nonparticipation of
some zealots and free riders, it requires the cooperation of many
75. This feature must be distinguished from jointness of supply, the property that one
person's use of the public good does not diminish the amount available to others.
Jointness of supply is one of the two defining characteristics of all public goods. See
supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
76. Olson believes that such a possibility is most likely in small groups. See infra
notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
77. See DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
14-15 (1991).
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citizens. The intermediate nature of public reason, falling between the
extremes of pure jointness and pure non-jointness of production,
makes its provision (in the optimal amount) still more problematic
than in most public goods situations.78
Public goods also differ in terms of the quantum of supply. On
the one hand, it might be that some public goods have an all-or-
nothing character (that is, the public good is provided either
completely or not at all). A lighthouse might be an example of such a
good. But surely most public goods admit of degrees of provision: A
lake can be cleaner or dirtier, a police force more or less effective, and
so on.79 Within the category of public goods that admit of degrees of
provision, we can distinguish those that are continuously variable from
those that are "lumpy," that is, that come into existence in discrete
chunks.8 0 A railroad system is lumpy in that its capacity grows only
when there are enough resources to add another set of tracks, but not
before. If a public good is of the sort produced in discontinuous
lumps, and my contribution could be the critical factor in bringing the
next chunk into existence, then the private benefit of contributing
might exceed my private cost. Prospects for the provision of lumpy
goods might therefore be somewhat brighter than the prospects for
smooth goods. 81 Unfortunately, it seems that public reason resembles
more a smooth than a lumpy public good in that it exists to a greater or
lesser extent depending on how many citizens constrain themselves
and how conscientiously they do so.
78. Moreover, to the extent that the committed Rawlsians do more than their fair
share to promote public reason, there is a problem of exploitation. See Part II.B
infra.
79. In fact, even apparently all-or-nothing public goods can to some extent be
provided in degrees, for while a lighthouse is either there or not, it can be taller
rather than shorter, the beam can be brighter or dimmer, etc.
80. See generally Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales and Lumpy
Goods: Alternative Models of Public Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350 (1982).
81. See id.; HARDIN, supra note 67, at 57; see also THEO OFFERMAN, BELIEFS AND
DECISION RULES IN PUBLIC GOOD GAMES (1997) (emphasizing the importance of
contributors' beliefs about their probability of being a critical contributor).
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In addition to public reason itself being a public good,
enforcing it through voluntary action poses a second-order collective
action problem. 82  Taking someone to task for violating neutrality
imposes a cost on the punisher. In addition to the (admittedly modest)
amount of time involved, publicly chastising a fellow citizen is, for
most people, a dreadful prospect, and there is at least a small amount
of personal risk involved. 83 (In fact, it might be that those persons
most committed to public reason-who might be expected to be
willing to do the most to enforce its requirements-would often
happen to be persons who are most averse to publicly reproving
others. 84) The benefit of providing such correction is unlikely to
accrue to the person making the recrimination, at least in the usual
case where one does not interact with the violator on a regular basis.
85
Since the recriminator cannot capture all of the benefits of his
scolding, his enforcement activity will fall short of the optimal level.
That public reason has the features of a public good, with all
the consequences that implies, pretty obviously cannot be a good thing
for the proponents of public reason. A plausible political theory
should, after all, be sensitive to such dynamics, even if it rejects a one-
dimensional view of human reasoning. And, to be sure, mainstream
political theorists certainly do not expect spontaneous contribution to
other public goods. 86 So it's no wonder we see so much less neutral
debate than its champions desire; it's the same reason we see so little
voluntary, private production of clean air.
Now, it might be that people in fact adhere to the constraints of
public reason to a greater extent than the conventional theory of
82. Cf JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 40-41 (1989) (describing enforcement
activities as collective action problems).
83. See id. at 132-33.
84. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (opining on the character of those
attracted to public reason).
85. The issue of repeat interaction is discussed in more detail in Section II.C.2.
86. See supra note 73.
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collective action would predict. It would be a difficult empirical
question to find out, especially since people can sometimes disagree
over whether a reason is neutral or not. But if an investigation finds
compliance in excess of what the model predicts, that would perhaps
be a Pyrrhic victory for the proponents of public reason, for it would
tend to undermine many of the assumptions upon which mainstream
political theorizing relies. Part III of this article shall indeed suggest
that the prospects for public reason (and other public goods) are
possibly not quite so grim as they look under the analysis laid out here.
But to the extent that the more hopeful diagnosis is correct, and to the
extent we want to further encourage public reason, we would need to
look to rather different models of collective action than the standard
theory expounded above.
Before proceeding to that discussion, however, we should
continue to draw out the implications of understanding public reason
as a public good.
B. Exploitation
The most well-known problem with public goods is that they
are not (sufficiently) produced. But there is more. Whenever the
provision of a public good is possible with less than full cooperation
from every citizen, there is the prospect of a disproportionate bearing
of burdens. While a climate of public reason cannot be provided by a
small handful of citizens acting alone, nor does it require that everyone
restrain himself on every occasion. Thus, a certain amount of free
riding is always safe, and we can expect that many citizens would like
to be those lucky free riders.
It might be that the resulting pattern of contribution and free
riding will be arbitrary and fluid, but it might also be systematically
skewed against certain groups. So far we have simply said that
everyone wants public reason to prevail, but individuals can vary in
their level of commitment. Parents of young children, for instance,
probably value municipal parks more highly than do the bed-ridden,
and the largest firms in a regulated industry will have more to gain
from waging a lobbying campaign (a public good to members of the
industry) than would smaller producers.
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The conventional model of collective action recognizes the
possibility of such asymmetries of interest and predicts that they will
lead to asymmetrical contributions to public goods.87 When some
individuals benefit from the public good more than other people, it
will be rational for them to make contributions (or make larger
contributions) in situations when those with lower valuations would
not find it in their own interest to do so. Those who care relatively
less about the public good can then free ride on the efforts of those for
whom the public good is dearer. A small tobacco farmer knows that
Phillip Morris will annually spend millions on lawyers and lobbyists
to protect its own corporate interests, and since the small farmer will
benefit as well, he can safely contribute little or nothing to the
industry's efforts.
Are there identifiable subgroups of citizens for whom a climate
of public reason is especially rewarding? It seems quite clear that
there are, even if only as a matter of historical accident. They are
likely to be tolerant, public-spirited, open-minded, cosmopolitan, and
probably generally liberal in their political sympathies. 88  Less
charitably, the fans of public reason are the wishy-washy and
uncommitted. In any case, they are, above all, readers of people like
Rawls and Ackerman.89
Such persons will not only find the climate of public reason
more advantageous than would the average citizen, but they might
87. See ANTHONY DE JASAY, SOCIAL CONTRACT, FREE RIDE: A STUDY OF THE
PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEM 205-18, 242-44 (1989); OLSON, supra note 65, at 27-29,
35.
88. See Kahan, supra note 8, at 489 ("Citizens who support egalitarianism and civic
solidarity are more likely to see appeal in liberal public reason, whether out of
principle or pragmatic calculation; citizens who support hierarchy and individualism
tend to put little value on liberal public reason .... ).
89. Perhaps more subtly, the beneficiaries of public reason are those with a facility in
empirical analysis and consequentialistic reasoning. While all dialogic theories favor
those who are good talkers, see JOHN E. SEERY, POLITICAL THEORY FOR MORTALS
172 (1996), public reason especially favors those who can talk in the registers of
statistics and public policy analysis.
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very well find the very act of engaging in public reason less costly
than it is for other citizens. For all of Rawls's insistence that public
reason constrains secular humanists from appealing to their contested
secular comprehensive doctrines, 90 we would be deceiving ourselves if
we thought that public reason required as much of a sacrifice from
them as it does from, say, Southern Baptists.
Since some citizens benefit more from public reason and find
contributing to it less costly, the conventional model predicts that we
should see them footing a disproportionate portion of the bill for it, to
the extent it exists at all. Those who care less about public reason will
contribute much less to its provision and enforcement, secure in the
knowledge that others will do enough to maintain a moderately
tolerable public sphere. And whenever things don't go their way,
those with low valuations can always credibly threaten to withdraw
themselves from the regime of public reason altogether, a prospect
frightening to Rawlsians. The ideal of public reason thus makes its
proponents into targets for exploitation. For anyone who obeys its
dictates, public reason offers unilateral disarmament in the face of an
actual cultural war.
91
It might be that some obligations are unconditional in that way:
One must not commit murder even in a crime-ridden society, for
instance. But can public reason honestly make that claim? Rawls at
times speaks of persons' "natural duties"-i.e., duties not conditioned
upon any voluntary act or receipt of benefits-as including a duty to
support just institutions and a duty of showing respect, along with
familiar duties to avoid injuring innocents and the like.92 But Rawls
probably should not be taken to require unconditional commitment
90. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also JOHN RAWLS, Commonweal
Interview with John Rawls, in COLLECTED PAPERS (Samuel Freeman, ed. 1999)
(denying, in interview with Catholic magazine, that public reason favors secularism).
91. Dan Kahan makes a similar observation. See Kahan, supra note 8, at 489 ("If
[progressives] give up on enhanced penalties for gay bashing, [social conservatives]
will still insist on the Defense of Marriage Act.").
92. RAWLS, supra note 73, at 109, 114-15, 334, 337-38.
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when it comes to public reason. For while he sees citizens as
reasonable as well as rational, the reasonable is not the same as self-
sacrificial altruism.93 Rather, persons are reasonable when they are
"ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation
and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will
likewise do so.
94
It is therefore best to think of the project of public reason as
falling under Rawls's general principle of fairness governing
participants engaged in mutually advantageous cooperative ventures.
That principle holds that one who takes advantage of the benefits of
others' cooperative restraint ought to do his fair share by likewise
conforming his own conduct to the same rules.95 Rawls's own general
approach would thus at most generate a duty to adhere to public reason
if others were engaged in the same project,96 but it would not demand
unilateral contribution to a nonexistent cooperative venture. And
regardless of what Rawls has to say about it, surely most citizens are
unwilling to be so demure. Even the proscription of homicide, after
all, allows an exception for self-defense. Would public reason ask its
adherents to be angels, or just fools?
C. Providing public reason
93. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 54. See generally Allan Gibbard, Constructing Justice,
20 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 264 (1991) (arguing that the dominant motivational
paradigm of Rawls's theory is neither impartial altruism nor rational advantage-
seeking but instead a notion of fair reciprocity).
94. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 49 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 111-12, 342-43. Rawls attributes the principle to Hart. See H.L.A. Hart,
Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 185-86 (1955), reprinted in
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 209, 219-20 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 1999).
96. It might not even achieve this much. Would widespread observance of public
reason impose a duty of compliance upon expressive zealots who view public reason
as worthless or even immoral? For a general criticism of the Hart/Rawls fairness
principle, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 90-95 (1974).
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The conventional theory of collective action predicts that
rational individuals, if left to their own devices, will not contribute
(enough) to the provision of public goods they value; and, to the extent
the goods are produced, the costs are likely to be unevenly distributed.
But individuals are not, of course, left to their own devices in these
matters, and we see public goods being provided all around us.
Identifying something as a public good is therefore usually a call to
action, not a consignment to despair. In the sections that follow, I
describe two common solutions to public goods problems. Yet while
these strategies succeed for many public goods, they offer only slim
hope of resolving the liberals' predicament.
1. Help from the state?
The standard solution to the public goods problem has
traditionally been a top-down system of enforced compliance.97
Nobody can be excluded from the benefits of sidewalks, for example,
so the government provides them and forces everyone to pay.
Behavioral public goods are also provided through compulsory
contribution systems: The state ensures the public good of public
order, for instance, by creating the machinery to detect and sanction
those who transgress against the community. Might the same work for
the public good of public reason? Cannot compliance with its
constraints, which (we are assuming) all citizens desire, simply be
compelled in the same way the state compels contributions to other
public goods?
At first glance, such a suggestion seems absurd, at least in a
country that cherishes free speech as much as ours, but the idea cannot
be dismissed out of hand. Indeed, proponents of public reason can
point to a number of social and political institutions that foster neutral
debate. For example, judicial review can be viewed as a way of
enforcing the constraints of public reason upon political action.
98
97. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
98. Ackerman, for example, imagines that citizens of a liberal polity might institute a
supreme court that would invalidate any action that its proponents could not defend
through a neutral, liberal dialogue. ACKERMAN, supra note 40, at 311.
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Judicial opinions, in addition to being exemplars of public reason, as
Rawls said they should be, would on this view also be public reason's
enforcement arm. That is, not only would the courts have to avoid
reliance on contested private sensibilities in reaching their own
decisions, they would in addition have to invalidate any political
decision that did rely on such factors.
The actual practice of the United States Supreme Court can to
a limited extent be understood in this way. Even when scrutinizing a
statute under rational basis review, an extremely lenient standard, the
Court still requires that the law advance a legitimate government
purpose, and, at least sometimes, the mere desire to exalt one group's
set of contested values (and denigrate another's) does not count as a
legitimate purpose.99 When governmental actions burden fundamental
rights such as the free exercise of religion, or differentiate between
citizens based on suspect classifications such as race, the Court will
scrutinize the asserted governmental purposes much more searchingly,
carefully looking beyond allegedly neutral justifications to see if
animus lies behind them.' 
00
Plainly, however, the Supreme Court is in many ways much
less than a guardian of public reason. A status group's attempt to
enlist the law to declare the superiority of its values need not involve a
bare desire to harm its opponents; cultural struggle need not implicate
the irrational animus the Court will forbid.' 0' Laws openly enacting
contested moralities and particular conceptions of the good regularly
pass constitutional muster. °2 It simply isn't true that courts think their
99. Eg., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (striking down state statute
the apparent purpose of which was expression of animus toward gays and lesbians);
Dep't. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (stating that a desire to harm
hippies is not a legitimate government purpose).
100. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (invalidating, over city's claimed public health justification, an ordinance
targeting practices of the Santeria religion).
101. Balkin, supra note 18, at 2317-18, 2332.
102. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (ruling that the
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purpose is to invalidate any governmental action that enshrines values
that lie outside the domain of the overlapping consensus of public
political culture.
Looking beyond judicial review, institutions that foster public
reason go deep into the structure of our polity. The two-party system,
for example, encourages each party to build platforms of relative
moderation and compromise, for fear that zealotry on any particular
issue would alienate its heterogeneous audience. The president, who
is often the leading public voice on issues of political concern, must
satisfy a nationwide constituency and therefore is similarly driven
towards public reason rather than particularism. Lower elected
officials still represent large numbers of people and therefore must
likewise moderate their zeal. Structural considerations such as these
brilliantly inform the political science of the Federalist, and a modern
critic of public reason would be remiss to neglect the extent to which
they can promote public reason, even in a society committed to
freedom of speech.
Yet even in Madison's view, the structure of the American
republic could only help control the dangerous effects of contentious
factions. "[T]he causes of faction," Madison believed, "cannot be
removed.... So too, although the outputs of the policy process
are perhaps to some degree encouraged to conform to public reason,
the process of public debate among citizens really is not. University
speech codes and workplace harassment laws certainly attempt to
constrain debate (though not necessarily in accordance with public
reason), but these are of marginal importance when one looks at
political discourse as a whole. Such regulation notwithstanding, the
First Amendment gives citizens an extraordinary immunity with
majority's moral condemnation of homosexual sodomy is a legitimate basis for a
criminal statute). But see id at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice. .. ")
103. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Madison). I do not claim that the problem of public
reason maps exactly onto the Framers' concern with faction, though the dynamics
are in many ways similar.
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respect to their participation in public discourse. They may publicly
assert any values they like, even absolutely vicious values that deny
the equality and dignity of their fellow citizens.' 0 4  What the First
Amendment fundamentally means, one could say, is that there can be
no leviathan to tame the dialogic state of nature.
Of course, pointing to current practice and Supreme Court
precedent does not necessarily show that a top-down approach cannot
work. On the contrary, in light of the severity of the strategic
difficulty so far identified, one could argue that our permissive free
speech doctrines need rethinking. Yet even those willing to consider
radical measures have to admit that the project of compelling
compliance with the dictates of public reason faces tremendous
obstacles, both of principle and of implementation. But while state
compulsion is the standard response to collective action problems,
there are other possibilities.
2. Small talk?
The pessimistic logic of collective action depends to some
extent on group size, with the prospects for the provision of public
goods shrinking as groups grow larger. 10 5  This is so for several
reasons. First, each individual can capture a greater portion of the
benefit of a public good in a small group than in a large one, making it
rational to invest more in the good's production. 10 6 Relatedly, as the
size of a group and its public good grows, it becomes less and less
luely that any individual or subset of individuals with unusually high
104. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding unconstitutional
an ordinance that criminalized the "communicat[ion of] messages of racial, gender,
or religious intolerance.").
105. OLSON, supra note 65, at 35 ("[T]he larger the group, the farther it will fall
short ofproviding an optimal amount of a collective good").
106. Id. at 48.
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valuations of the good will find it profitable to provide the good on
their own.107
More importantly, smaller groups are more effective at
monitoring compliance and, at least when interactions are repeated,
applying social sanctions. 1°8 In a household of three, it is relatively
easy to tell who is contributing to the public good of a clean kitchen
and who is shirking. The housemate who fails to do his part can be
pressured or reprimanded by his fellows, whom he must see everyday.
Moreover, given that the same actors will face the collective action
problem over and over, threats to punish are credible. In a large
communal living group, in contrast, it is much more difficult to detect
non-compliance, which explains why we see so few such
arrangements.' 09
Of course, it isn't only households that manage to provide
public goods without the state. Elinor Ostrom, in studies of villages in
rural Japan, Spain, Switzerland, and the Philippines, has found that the
villagers' use of shared open-access resources avoids the tragic results
predicted by the conventional theory of collective action. 10 These
resource management regimes have in some cases endured for
hundreds of years."' Robert Ellickson's now-classic study of Shasta
County ranchers found that beneficial cooperation did not require top-
down legal rules.' 1
2
107. Id.
108. This point is widely recognized. See, e.g., id at 62-63; CHONG, supra note 77,
at 35; TAYLOR, supra note 63, at 105.
109. According to the Census Bureau's 1999 American Housing Survey, households
of three or more unrelated persons make up less than 1% of U.S. households. See
U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey: Detailed Tables for Total Occupied
Housing Units, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/
99dtchrt/tab2-9.html.
110. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 58-102 (1990).
111. Id. at 58.
112. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991).
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But such results, interesting and important as they are, offer
little hope to proponents of public reason, at least when it comes to
interactions among ordinary citizens, whose (non-)compliance with
public reason is my primary topic. 113 To begin with, while a Swiss
mountain village is larger than a household, it is certainly smaller than
a country. Such a community succeeds because it is relatively
stable 14 and thick with communal ties,' 15 both of which mean that
encounters are likely to be repeated rather than one-off. 116 Reputation,
also known as gossip, is extremely important in such communities.
Preserving one's reputation and social standing, and that of one's
family, gives powerful incentives to contribute to the public good. In
contrast, the types of societies that most urgently need public reason-
large, demographically diverse, anonymous, culturally divided-have
little to do with Ostrom's mountain hamlets.
113. The situation is different with respect to political parties and public officials. A
legislature is relatively small, and so its members can be expected to restrain
themselves for the sake of smoothing future interactions. See DONALD R.
MATTHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 92 (1960) ("'There is a great
pressure for conformity in the Senate,' one of its influential members said. 'It's just
like living in a small town."'); see also id. at 97-101 (discussing norms of courtesy
and reciprocity in the Senate).
114. OSTROM, supra note 110, at 88 ("[T]he populations in these locations have
remained stable over long periods of time. Individuals have shared a past and expect
to share a future. It is important for individuals to maintain their reputations as
reliable members of the community. These individuals live side by side and farm the
same plots year after year.)
115. For studies from different disciplines emphasizing the importance of social ties,
see, e.g., MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY, AND LIBERTY (1982); and
Gerald Marwell et al., Social Networks and Collective Action: A Theory of the
Critical Mass 111 94 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 502, 502, 505 (1988); see also ELLICKSON,
supra note 112, at 167, 177-83 (discussing the cooperative success of close-knit
groups).
116. It is well known that repeated interaction, coupled with the ability to monitor
compliance, can lead to cooperation among rational egoists. See generally ROBERT
M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). When one moves beyond
Axelrod's two-player game, however, cooperation is less likely because monitoring
becomes increasingly difficult. TAYLOR, supra note 63, at 105.
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Thus, while Madison thought a continent-wide republic would
salve the potential zealotry of democracy, 17 the scholarship canvassed
above suggests that localism and subsidiarity might actually offer the
best hope to those who wish to see ordinary citizens engaging in
public reason. A large group, if organized as a confederation of
smaller organized units, can take advantage of the incentives and
pressures that make its smaller component units more successful
providers of public goods. 1 8 So even if public reason cannot succeed
across a continent, it might succeed within each individual
community, each with its matrix of familial, social, professional, and
religious ties. The political recommendation, therefore, would be to
push as many political debates as possible down to the smallest
practical unit of government. Instead of having a national debate on
some divisive issue or another, we would have thousands of local
debates, each drawing on Ellickson/Axelrod dynamics to provide the
incentives necessary to overcome the collective action problem. Thus,
while one popular argument for federalism is that it promotes greater
citizen involvement in politics, 1 9 the argument here would be that it
can encourage compliance with public reason.
Now there might be something to this argument, but to
whatever extent local political discourse features less cultural combat
than national debate, at least a large part of the reason is simply that a
small community is likely to be less diverse than a larger one. The
values shared by all reasonable members of a small community-its
public reason, as it were-might be given by a literal reading of the
Bible in one locale and by the child-rearing advice of Dr. Benjamin
Spock in another. Within such a community, we might indeed find
117. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Madison).
118. Dennis Chong makes this observation in a discussion of collective action in the
civil rights movement. See CHONG, supra note 77, at 35-36.
119. E.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 95 (1980); Gregory v. Ashcrott,
501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("[Federalism] increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes.").
254 [Vol.4:217
PUBLIC REASON AS A PUBLIC GOOD
very little rancorous clash of values, if only because there is little
opportunity for disagreement.
But even if devolved debate is better for reasons besides in-
built homogeneity, surely liberals should feel uncomfortable with
solutions that rely so heavily on provincialism and gossipy social
control. Localizing every political question might in fact further
fragment an already divided polity, denigrating the importance of
whatever national values there are.la2 Anyway, it is not clear that local
debates generally score better in terms of neutral dialogue than
national ones: School board elections can bring out some of the
fiercest clashes of values. 12' Since it is local attitudes that matter most
in our daily lives-members of a far-off community will not be able to
disapprove of my interracial relationship, even if they would be
inclined to-local politics contains greater expressive capital. 22 That
local politics therefore engenders such intense interest can of course be
a reason to celebrate it, but it also increases the cost of complying with
public reason.
IH. PUBLIC REASON AS AN ASSURANCE PROBLEM
Drawing upon the conventional theory of collective action,
Part II paints a rather grim picture for supporters of public reason.
Because public reason is a public good, citizens are faced with a
collective action problem. In these situations, we know from
economic theory that provision of the good will fall short of the
optimum. Moreover, to the extent that public reason does exist, I
120. Steven Teles makes this point in relation to the effort to decentralize the welfare
reform debate. See STEVEN M. TELES, WHOSE WELFARE? AFDC AND ELITE
POLITICS 175 (1996).
121. "Cultural conflicts become easily centered upon school curricula because the
content of education depends on cultural assumptions .... Whose values shall be
legitimized and made dominant by being the content of education?... [C]urricular
changes 'bear witness' to . . . the domination of one cultural group and the
subordination of another." GUSFIELD, supra note 21, at 181-82.
122. McAdams, Expressive Law, supra note 13, at 373-74.
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argued that contributions would be spread unevenly, with the most
committed Rawlsians in effect being exploited by their fellow citizens.
The standard solution to public goods problems is of course
government provision, but in this case the First Amendment and the
liberal principles that underlie public reason foreclose such a plan.
Without the usual remedy, we are left with a full-blown case of the
free rider pathology. Since the program of public reason does not
work, or works only if its adherents are suckers, it is not an attractive
ideal.
It is true that there are other theoretically and empirically
documented ways around collective action problems. These
approaches, however, are most promising in contexts of repeated
interactions within small, thick communities. They might work in
legislatures, and they might in some cases provide another argument
for decentralized government, but all in all they offer little hope to
partisans of public reason.
This final part of the article presents hope for a partial strategic
resuscitation of the ideal of public reason. As will come out below,
the project of public reason need not be strategically doomed to
collective failure. Real world experience shows that large, dispersed,
anonymous groups of citizens do sometimes manage to provide public
goods voluntarily. It would be unfair to consign public reason to the
grave of Part II if it turns out that the familiar story of collective action
presented there captures only some of the truth about human
interaction in public goods situations.
The model of public goods provision elaborated below still
features a collective action problem, but now it is seen as a problem of
coordination of expectations. Even if this new understanding is
correct-and there is good reason to think it is at least partly
accurate-public reason cannot always be had even if almost everyone
is willing to restrain himself The problem here is not one of
motivation but of information.
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A. The assurance game
In the conventional theory of collective action, contributing to
public goods is modeled as a many-player prisoner's dilemma.'
23
Cooperation is doomed to failure in such a game because there is a
dominant strategy of noncooperation: whatever the other players do, it
is always in the individual's interest not to contribute to the public
good.
An alternative way of representing the relevant features of a
public goods interaction is the game of assurance.124 The game could
describe the choices individuals face in any number of public goods
situations, including the decision whether to carry a concealed weapon
and the decision whether to join a strike.' 25 The chart below illustrates
such a game, using concealed weapons as an example.
123. See supra note 67.
124. For a discussion of the structure of the assurance game and its relevance to
public goods problems, see TAYLOR, supra note 63, at 37-39. Amartya Sen was
among the first to recognize the assurance problem and its significance. See Amartya
K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount, 80 Q.J. ECON. 112
(1967).
125. The weapons example comes from Thomas C. Schelling, Hockey Helmets,
Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Savings, 17 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 381, 403
n. 11 (1973), though Schelling does not explicitly mention the assurance game in the
passage. For a discussion of the decision whether to join a strike as an assurance
game, see CHONG, supra note 108, at 118-20.
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The numerals indicate each player's ordinal rankings of the
outcomes. Thus, the combination of an armed Person A and a
disarmed Person B represents the second-best outcome for Person A
and the fourth-best (i.e. the worst) outcome for Person B.
Regardless of how one feels about gun ownership, everyone
has to admit that carrying a concealed weapon in public has a cost,
both in terms of money and in terms of the risk of accidental death of
the owner (or someone else) from a misfire; yet, at the same time,
carrying a weapon also offers protection from armed intimidation by
the other player, and (we'll assume) the protection gained by evening
the playing field outweighs the cost of carrying. The central dynamic
of the situation, then, is that each player would prefer not to carry a
weapon in public but also wants to have one if the other person does.
If he can be assured that the other will not carry a weapon, he won't do
so either (the outcome represented by the upper-left cell). But if he
thinks the other person is (or might be' 26) carrying a weapon, he will
want to have one to defend himself (as happens in the lower-right
cell).
126. I typically will not know with certainty whether or not you are carrying a
weapon. The confidence level at which I will switch strategies depends on the
relative magnitudes of the various payoffs.
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The game becomes a bit more realistic if we expand it to an
indefinite number of players and admit that each person's knowledge
of the other players' preferences is incomplete. Presenting such a
game in matrix form is impracticable, but the following chart helpfully
illustrates the payoffs, as a function of other players' choices, facing






As the curves indicate, which strategy is best depends on one's
estimation of the number of people who have chosen each one. For
the person whose preferences are modeled in the graph, the payoff
from disarming surpasses the payoff from arming as long as the
number of disarmed citizens exceeds N; if fewer than N of his fellows
are disarmed, on the other hand, he should arm himself. Similarly, it
is safe to go on strike when most other workers in the factory strike as
well, but I will probably get fired if I am one of a few agitators.
One might wonder how there really could be a collective action
problem in situations like these. After all, if everyone prefers not to
carry a weapon as long as nobody else does, and if everyone knows
that everyone knows this, shouldn't the players automatically fix upon
the strategy of universal non-carrying? Realizing that everybody
knows that nobody will get fired if all go on strike for better wages,
why doesn't everyone strike?
In real life, the situation is in fact more complex and uncertain.
Suppose for instance that a very few citizens prefer (or are merely
believed to prefer) to carry a gun even when others are disarmed, or
that some citizens will not disarm unless they are absolutely certain
that everyone else has. The belief, even an unreasonable belief, that a
few people might be armed will lead the most skittish citizens to keep
their own weapons. Seeing now that an appreciable number of people
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are armed, other citizens will do the same, and this will cause even
more to follow suit until everyone is carrying a weapon, much to the
detriment of all.
Both the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game posit that
the players prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection. Both
models also agree that nobody wants to be a sucker: If the others
aren't cooperating, then I won't either. The key difference is found in
the payoff I get when other people are cooperating. In the prisoner's
dilemma, free riding is preferred to cooperating with the other
participants, but in the assurance game it is not.
According to the conventional theory of collective action,
modeled as a prisoner's dilemma, it is therefore best to withhold
cooperation regardless of what the other player does, so there is only
one equilibrium: mutual noncooperation. In the assurance game, as
we have seen, mutual cooperation and mutual noncooperation are both
possible equilibrium outcomes.127 The public good of a weapon-free
public space is strategically stable, but so is the Wild West. This
stability is a good thing if we find ourselves in the cooperative
equilibrium, but a bad thing if we find ourselves in the noncooperative
one. The bad outcome can stubbornly persist, precisely because it is a
strategic equilibrium, even if everyone finds it worse than the
cooperative equilibrium. But, at least, there is the possibility of a
better outcome, if only perceptions and expectations would change.
Might the same be true of the abortion debate and other instances in
which public reason is currently scarce? Would everyone limit herself
to neutral dialogue if only she expected others to do the same?
B. Reciprocity theory
127. As those familiar with game theory will recognize, the concept of equilibrium
employed here is the standard notion of Nash equilibrium. An outcome of a game is
in Nash equilibrium if each player's decision is the best response to the other
player's decision. In such a situation, neither player has any reason to switch
strategies, so the outcome is stable. NiCHOLSON, supra note 62, at 342.
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Before applying the assurance model to public debate, it is
proper to inquire into the model's underpinnings. After all, it hardly
counts as a successful argument to draw a chart of an assurance game
and then assert that it captures the truth about some particular
collective interaction. One can draw lots of different charts, each with
a different tautological answer, and one should not simply pick a graph
and solve the problem by ipse dixit. What is required is a
psychologically and empirically credible story that shows that the
assurance model captures some of the truth here.
Support for the assurance model comes from an alternative
theory of collective action, sometimes called reciprocity theory, which
posits that most people will contribute to public goods (or, more
generally, cooperate in collective action) if they believe that others are
contributing, but not contribute if they believe that others are not.' 28
The theory thus predicts greater prospects for successful collective
action, and, more importantly, makes significantly different policy
recommendations than the standard framework. Significantly,
reciprocity dynamics do not necessarily require communal ties or
repeated interaction to succeed.
Reciprocity theory finds support in laboratory experiments and
real world evidence. One experiment for testing the behavioral
predictions generated by the two contending theories is the so-called
public goods game. 129 This game involves a number of participants,
each of whom is given an initial endowment of money or tokens.
Each person can either keep his private resources or contribute to a
128. My description of this contending account of collective action draws on the
work of Dan Kahan, who is largely responsible for introducing it into the legal
literature. See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV.
333, 335-40 (2001) [hereinafter Kahan, Trust]; Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of
Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2003) [hereinafter Kahan, Reciprocity]. Others have presented similar theories. See,
e.g., Robert Sugden, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary
Contributions, 94 ECON. J. 772 (1984) (providing an economic model of conditional
contribution to public goods).
129. For a description, see Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of
Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 137, 139 (2000).
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common fund, which is multiplied and then distributed equally to
everyone, contributors and noncontributors alike. The socially optimal
outcome is for each person to contribute all of his endowment to the
public good, but it is in each individual's interest to keep his tokens
and free ride on the contributions (if any) of the other players. These
games are typically anonymous, so that participants need not fear
sanctions outside the laboratory.
These experiments have found not only that people often do
contribute a significant portion of their endowment, but that people
who believe others will contribute are themselves more likely to
contribute. 130  (In the standard model, believing that others will
foolishly contribute in no way changes the fact that my expected
income is greatest when I contribute nothing.) Subjects' response to
others' behavior can also be tested by looking at trends in multi-period
public good games. Subjects typically contribute an intermediate
amount of resources in the early rounds, but the game soon tends
toward one of two directions in the remaining rounds: consistently
high (but not quite socially optimal) contributions in some cases and
repeated near-zero contribution in the others.' 3 1 In a similar result,
bad experiences playing the prisoner's dilemma game can cause
subjects to prefer free riding to cooperating when earlier they
expressed an aversion to free riding. 1
32
As I noted previously, the conventional theory foresees a
problem of exploitation: To whatever extent provision of a public
good is possible with less than complete cooperation from everyone,
some citizens-perhaps always the same ones-will be able to
contribute less than others. The experimental evidence, however,
130. Id. at 140 (summarizing the results of many studies); see also OFFERMAN, supra
note 81, at 107-08 (concluding that the observed correlation between own
contributions and expectations of others' contributions is most adequately explained
by the hypothesis that the latter determines the former).
131. John 0. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL EcoNoMIcs 139-40 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth
eds., 1995).
132. Ostrom, supra note 129, at 146.
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should lead us to doubt that proposition. Individuals who know that
other participants in a public goods game have a much higher
valuation of the public good do not in fact always free ride on the
predictably higher contributions of those with high valuations.1
33
Contrary to the conventional theory's implication that citizens will vie
to be a lucky free rider whenever a public good can be produced with
less than universal cooperation, evidence shows that citizens' dislike
of making redundant contributions is less important than their desire to
avoid making futile contributions.' 34 In other words, they certainly
don't want to contribute when too few others are contributing, but they
don't much bother with seeking out opportunities to free ride when
contribution is the norm.
What the results indicate, in sum, is that people who find
themselves in public goods situations are capable of multiple
behavioral responses and that their responses depend in large part
upon their observations of others' tendency to cooperate or not. Since
either choice tends to encourage others to match it, these interactions
exhibit two relatively stable equilibria, one of widespread contribution
and the other of near universal defection.
The same dynamics are evident in collective action situations
outside the laboratory. A recent study of tax compliance, for example,
found that sending taxpayers a letter telling them that the
overwhelming majority of citizens pay all of their taxes was more
effective in promoting compliance than a letter telling them that their
returns were especially likely to be audited. 135 Other evidence from
the tax compliance literature also shows that the perceived level of tax
133. Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public
Goods P Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem, 84 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY 1335, 1355 (1979).
134. OFFERMAN, supra note 81, at 120.
135. See STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP'T OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME
TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT 19, 24-25 (1996).
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compliance is the most important factor in an individual's decision. 136
Reaching a parallel conclusion is a study of citizens' reactions to a
judicially mandated busing plan intended to desegregate Boston's
public schools. Citizens opposed to the plan became more disposed
toward taking part in boycotts and protests-public goods for busing
opponents-to the extent that they perceived higher levels of
collective action and public opinion against the court order.
137
If the same dynamics characterize the public good of public
reason, we would expect to see citizens restraining themselves when
they see others doing so, but not when they do not. As the school
desegregation study shows (and others also affirm 138) such an
assurance/reciprocity dynamic can apply in the context of real-world
political activity. The following section considers whether the same
dynamic is applicable to political discourse in particular.
C. Mutually assured dialogue
It is quite clear that our micro-level economies of public
speech militate against rancorous clashes of values in public debate.
Sociolinguists have shown, for instance, that powerful and widespread
norms require speakers to soften, or abstain altogether from, speech
acts that threaten hearers' ever-vulnerable sense of "face."'
139
Significantly, among those face-threatening acts are those statements
136. See Kahan, Trust, supra note 128, at 340-44 (citing studies); cf John T. Scholz
& Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective
Action, 42 AM. J. POL. Sci. 398 (1998) (finding that level of trust in government and
fellow citizens has a significant and substantial effect on tax compliance,
independent of fear of sanctions or feelings of duty).
137. D. GARTH TAYLOR, PUBLIC OPINION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE BOSTON
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CONFLICT 166-70 (1986).
138. See also CHONG, supra note 77, at 103-140 (discussing aspects of the 1960s
civil rights movement in terms of assurance games).
139. See, e.g., PENELOPE BROWN & STEPHEN LEVINSON, POLITENESS 59-71 (rev. ed.
1987).
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that express disapproval of a hearer's values or beliefs. 141 Other
investigations of conversational rules have elaborated upon the public
norm of "showing consideration for the sensibilities of others," which
requires that speakers refrain from provocative assertions of
disagreement. 14 1  Yet they have also argued that the norm is
conditional: A speaker who does not show adequate self-restraint risks
forfeiting his claim to respectful consideration by his hearers. 14
2
These findings surely resonate with experience, and they tend to
provide a micro-level foundation for public reason, including its
apparent reciprocal aspect.
We certainly do observe some debates in which public reason
seems to be ascendant. Much of the recent debate over the death
penalty, for example, has taken such a turn. While the death penalty
debate can create divisive cleavages pitting citizens with more
authoritarian and fundamentalist outlooks against citizens with more
egalitarian views, 143 both sides share basic values of rationality and
due process that condemn execution of the innocent. Considerations
based on that shared concern led the Republican governor of Illinois, a
death penalty supporter, to impose a temporary moratorium on
executions. 14  In the case of abortion, in contrast, posters of bloody
fetuses and the vehement rejection of the other side's values seem to
be the dominant modes of argument, at least in this country. 1
45
140. Id. at 66-67, 101-29.
141. Kochman, supra note 55, at 203-05.
142. Id. at 204-06.
143. See Kahan, supra note 8, at 439-45 (casting the death penalty debate as a clash
of two opposed cultural styles). See generally supra Section I.A. (discussing status
competition and symbolic politics).
144. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan Suspends Death Penalty, Illinois First
State to Impose Moratorium on Executions, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2000, at 1. The
moratorium phenomenon does of course have a more strategic aspect as well. See
Jack Hitt, The Moratorium Gambit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at 82.
145. This is not a necessary feature of debating abortion. Mary Ann Glendon has
contended that European countries have conducted the abortion debate in less
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That we should see the same citizens following the strictures of
public reason in some debates but not in others should not come as a
surprise, for experimental evidence shows that rates of contribution in
public goods games are highly context-specific and susceptible to
framing effects. 14 6 Outside of the laboratory, the same Americans who
voluntarily comply with tax laws at the same time withhold
contributions to the public good of waste disposal by refusing to have
a facility sited in their communities. 147  There are no universal
cooperators and defectors across all contexts. History matters, and so
do frames of perception; both inform individuals' beliefs about the
likely behavior of others in the particular social dilemma, which in
turn shapes their own behavior in that specific context.
The public's knowledge of how the abortion debate has usually
been conducted-"Either you're for killing babies or you're against
killing babies," as one pro-life leader put it 48 _-dooms citizens to
continue that style of interaction, even if (almost) everyone would
prefer that things were different. Since any halfway-informed pro-
choice citizen knows that the other side is going to level the charge of
baby killing-an assertion phrased in such inflammatory terms that the
pro-choicer cannot in any way admit to it or try to explain it-the pro-
choicer's natural response is to deny the premise that the fetus is alive
or indeed deny that it is an entity worthy of any concern whatsoever.
But to someone unfamiliar with the strategic dynamics of the abortion
debate, that response would seem to evince a willed blindness to the
obvious reality that something of value is at stake. 149 Yet given the
strident terms. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW
10-62 (1987).
146. Ostrom, supra note 129, at 140-4 1.
147. See Kahan, Reciprocity, supra note 128 (showing that the U.S. has a higher
level of tax compliance than Europe but a worse NIMBY problem).
148. Quoted in JOSEPH A. CALFANO, GOVERNING AMERICA 84 (1981).
149. Rawls thinks that a debate over abortion conducted on the basis of public
reason would include consideration of the political value of due respect for human
life, though he also believes that the balance of public reasons favors a right to
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anticipated pro-life strategy, there's really no other option than a
hardline one, even if it leads to the otherwise strange insistence that
assailants who kill a fetus while assaulting a pregnant woman should
face punishment no different than that for assault. 50 And can a poster
of a bloody fetus be matched by anything other than a bloody coat
hanger, and vice versa? The current style of debate perpetuates itself,
on the reciprocity view, by shaping expectations of how others will
behave in this situation.
D. Prescriptions and implications
The conventional model of collective action recommends the
application of sanctions or incentives, in effect redefining individuals'
payoffs so that they would find it advantageous to contribute to the
public good. The assurance/reciprocity model of public goods
provision, while less uniformly pessimistic than the conventional
model, does not eliminate the collective action problem but rather
recasts it as a problem of coordination of expectations. Citizens who
find themselves in the bad equilibrium-whether because of history,
chance, or whatever-would be willing to contribute, but only if they
came to believe, despite what they saw before them, that (enough of)
their fellows would do the same. How might they all come to believe
this?
The following sections briefly consider how a switch from the
noncooperative to the cooperative equilibrium can be brought about
and how the reverse can be prevented. Formal game theory has
relatively little to say about this issue. 151 The reciprocity theory of
abortion in the first trimester (and possibly later). See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 243
n.32.
150. See American Civil Liberties Union, What's Wrong with Fetal Rights: A Look
at Fetal Protection Statutes and Wrongful Death Actions on Behalf of Fetuses, July
1996, at http://www.aclu.org/issues/reproduct/fetal.html.
151. As conceded in DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING
95-97 (1990).
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collective action, though it falls far short of generating anything like a
complete policy program, does indicate a few important factors that
recommend themselves to the attention of public reason's friends.
1. Containing zealots
Reciprocity theory posits, and experimental evidence indicates,
that individuals vary in their propensity to contribute to public goods
and in their tolerance of free riding. 152 Some people will report all of
their income even when they see quite a few people padding
deductions, but others will bolt whenever they see any free riding.
Still others, though they still prefer that the public good be provided,
are determined to free ride even when everyone else is contributing.
With a public good such a public reason, however, there is the
additional problem that some citizens will see a climate of public
reason as a bad, not a good. These are citizens who thrive on conflict
and intolerance, those who so value the chance to impose their value
system on others that they will risk being oppressed themselves. Their
defection from public reason is not a case of free riding on a common
effort but rather an indication that they are workin 5 toward a
completely different goal. This is the problem of zealotry.
Non-zealots might very well be able to tolerate the actions of a
small number of determined zealots. Knowledge that there are a
relative few government-hating tax protestors out there doesn't bother
the average taxpayer, precisely because those protestors are few and
extreme, and thus can safely be thought of as lunatics, people wholly
152. OFFERMAN, supra note 81, at 120; Kahan, Reciprocity, supra note 128; Ostrom,
supra note 129, at 141-43.
153. Note that zealots face the collective action problem of getting potential
followers to participate in expressive campaigns in support of their cultural style and
values, which campaigns are public goods to members of that status group. A status
group, however, is by definition smaller, more homogeneous, and more tightly
bonded than society at large, so the forces of zeal have an inherent comparative
advantage over the forces of public reason when it comes to solving collective action
problems.
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unlike one's reliable fellow taxpayers. The real problem occurs when
zealots are so perceptible (even if not necessarily so numerous) that
their behavior starts to look less like an anomaly and more like an
acceptable position in the particular debate at issue. 154  Zealots
provoke, and those non-zealots least committed to the restraints of
public reason will soon abandon the project as well. Starting to sense
that many others are not willing to restrain themselves, average
citizens' support for public reason will erode, domino-like, until only
the most determined cooperators remain.
One aim for those who wish to sustain public reason is
therefore to contain the effect of zealots. This could mean controlling
their numbers, but much more importantly the task is to control the
meaning of the zealots' acts and words, marking them out as aberrant.
This is something that the criminal law is quite good at doing. As one
can readily imagine, of course, there are a great many weighty
considerations militating against allowing the law to fetter public
debate, even the speech of zealots. Yet unlike with the conventional
theory, under which everyone needs to be given an incentive to
contribute to a public good, here the sanctions would need to be aimed
at only a few-indeed, they must be targeted at only a few if the
penalties are to send the proper message. The law could safely focus
on only the worst zealots, such as those that couple their discursive
zealotry with criminal action. This is an argument for sentence-
enhancement laws, for instance, which can designate certain intolerant
values as aberrant without violating the Constitution.'55
Yet the law should not focus too much on preventing bad
outcomes. For some reason, individuals seem to contribute more
when told about the positive consequences of contributing to the
public good than when told of the negative consequences of
154. Nancy Rosenblum has made a similar observation about the militia movement.
See ROSENBLUM, supra note 24, at 287 ("[M]ilitias cannot be handily dismissed as
'paranoid fringe' if their alarm about overweening federal government is reinforced
by a flood of similar assertions by groups that never describe themselves as
extremist .... ").
155. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
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refusing. 156 Emphasis should therefore be placed on the good that
public reason promises rather than on the bad of divisive, clash-of-
values politics.
2. Leadership
Theorists employing an economically oriented "political
entrepreneur" model have contended that political leaders can play a
pivotal role in facilitating the provision of public goods.157 Individuals
value public goods, but, as we have seen, they have trouble providing
them on their own. The public's willingness to pay creates an
opportunity for the profitable provision of those goods, if only the
requisite degree of organization can be found. Enter the
entrepreneurial politician, whose actions can be understood as
providing the good through contributions from the public and then
skimming off a portion of the contributions as profit.'
5
The model of collective action adduced in this part also
envisions an important role for leaders, but it is a very different kind of
role. According to this model, recall, we should expect to see higher
levels of contribution to public goods when citizens believe that their
fellow citizens are contributing or are willing to contribute. To some
extent a person can make such an assessment by directly observing
others' behavior. Yet, it is not clear what one should conclude from
seeing nonprovision of a public good, for the mere observation of
current nonprovision is ambiguous with respect to the public's
preference for the good. The brave individuals who try to switch the
equilibrium, if any such persons can be found, will bear heavy costs
even if it turns out that others decide to follow. 159 But, even worse,
156. OFFERMAN, supra note 81, at 171-72.
157. See, e.g, NORMAN FROHLICH ET AL., POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE
GOODS (1971).
158. Id at 5-8, 57.
159. Successful voluntary provision of many public goods in fact depends on the
existence of a critical mass of individuals willing to bear the start-up costs. Pamela
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the first contributors may fail in their attempt to switch equilibria,
either because they are too few to make a perceptible impact or
because, in this situation at least, too many of their fellows prefer free
riding or zealotry. Because of the lack of good information, deciding
to contribute is thus a risky proposition.
Fortunately, citizens contemplating contributing can gather
information about their fellows' predispositions by looking to the
opinions of community leaders and using those views as signals of
more widespread dispositions toward contribution. Real-world
evidence in fact shows that citizens' assessment of the level of public
cooperation in collective action situations responds significantly to the
perceived views of political leaders and other "attention-callers." In
the Boston schools case discussed above, 160 citizens who perceived
strong and consistent opposition to integration on the part of a few
prominent community leaders were more likely to believe that there
was widespread public support for collective action against busing,
and those citizens also predicted greater levels of public participation
in protests in the subsequent time period. 161
According to the reciprocity theory of public reason, therefore,
leaders can play a very helpful role in signaling the proper mode of
public debate. And, as we saw earlier, there are significant
institutional incentives for public officials to abide by the dictates of
public reason. 162 Perversely, however, on many issues it is precisely
the zealots, not sober officials with broad constituencies and electoral
worries, who are the real opinion leaders. The follow-the-leader
aspect of public reason predicted by reciprocity theory can thus be
quite destructive. Bearing out this theoretical prediction, a recent
Oliver et al., A Theory of the Critical Mass T Interdependence, Group
Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action, 91 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 522,
542-43 (1985); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 903, 929-30 (1996) (discussing the role of "norm entrepreneurs").
160. Supra note 137 and accompanying text.
161. TAYLOR, supra note 137, at 82-84.
162. Supra Section II.C.
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study of the politics of welfare reform finds that a solid public
consensus-which emphasizes the value of work, as well as the value
of truly aiding those who cannot find it-has been thwarted by opinion
elites who are determined to use welfare reform as a symbolic weapon
of cultural conflict.' 63 The same might be true of abortion. 164 If the
most prominent voices on a particular question eschew public reason,
then there is little hope for the ordinary citizens who use those voices
as dialogic cues. Once more, this can happen even if almost everyone
would actually prefer a different climate to prevail.
CONCLUSION
Led by the influential writings of John Rawls and Bruce
Ackerman, recent liberal political theorizing has relied upon an ideal
of constrained dialogue as a means of securing peace and legitimacy in
polities riven by deep and irreconcilable clashes of basic values. The
public reason project can be criticized on any number of grounds, but I
have focused on the strategic plausibility of public reason, an issue
largely unexplored in the literature. Public reason is a public good
and, depending on one's conception of collective action, it is at worst
strategically untenable and at best discomfitingly unstable. This
article thus provides an account of why neutral dialogue seems so
often to fail us.
How bad is the prognosis? According to the standard logic of
collective action, developed in Part II, the success of public reason is
almost beyond hoping for. No individual can make an appreciable
difference in the tone of public debate, and none can be excluded or
sanctioned for ignoring the strictures of public reason. As such, only
163. TELES, supra note 120, at 12-17, 76-78, 165.
164. According to Kristen Luker, the abortion debate can best be understood as a
contest over the meaning of sexuality and family carried on by activists with
radically differing worldviews. See LUKER, supra note 23, at 192-245. This might
help explain why progress has proven nearly impossible despite the apparently more
consensualist opinions held by the public at large. See GLENDON, supra note 145, at
40-42.
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fools, altruists, or masochists would listen to the call of Rawls and
Ackerman, but surely no plausible theory can rest on that
psychological foundation. The usual solutions recommended by the
conventional account of collective action-namely, state compulsion
or thick communities-offer little promise in the context of public
reason.
Part III kept the focus on strategic concerns but recast the
collective action problem as a problem of information. Drawing on
work in sociology, experimental economics, and linguistics, it
explored the implications for public debate of a contending, somewhat
less pessimistic, model of public goods provision. According to that
theory, individuals can in many instances be expected voluntarily to
contribute to public goods, but only when they believe that others are
similarly disposed.
The alternative account can accommodate what seems like the
accurate observation that we see public reason operating in some cases
but not in others. More importantly, it generates a different
understanding of why public reason succeeds or fails and what can be
done about it. In the standard model, individuals respond
mechanistically to incentives to cooperate or free ride. In the
alternative account, one has to deal with the much muddier stuff of
perceptions and social meanings, which are sticky, hard to predict, and
sometimes unreasonable. History informs them, and so do the media.
Those who wish to promote public reason will therefore need to study
particular debates at a level of detail more characteristic of cultural
anthropology than political philosophy.
One of the primary conclusions one draws from viewing public
reason through the lens of the assurance model is that the strategy of
public reason can be quite sensitive to the actions of a relative few
agents. This is troubling in that it means that a few zealots can push a
debate into an equilibrium that almost nobody wants. In a sense, this
conclusion brings us full circle, for the assurance account has led,
though for a different reason, to the same perversity Mancur Olson
identified: A group of individuals, though rational and sharing a
common interest, might not be able to cooperate to achieve their aim.
Yet if anything the conclusion is now even more unfortunate, for here
the blame does not lie with each person's self-interested incentive to
free ride (as it does on the conventional theory), but rather it lies with
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the power of a few individuals to determine the equilibrium behavior
of the public at large. Even if the vast majority of citizens prefer that
public reason prevail and prefer cooperating to free riding-conditions
sufficient to solve Olson's problem-their aim might still be
frustrated. The assurance model, therefore, might in the end prove
even more disheartening to the proponent of neutral discourse than
would the standard Olsonian logic.
The more positive side of the assurance model is that small
groups committed to public reason's success can also have a
disproportionate impact. It might be that a good equilibrium is
sustainable in some situations currently characterized by bad
equilibria. (The mere observation of a noncooperative state of affairs,
recall, is ambiguous with respect to the possibility of a better
outcome.) Any who rhetorically disarm in such a situation risk much,
but on the other hand people seem to respond favorably to a show of
trust in otherwise uncooperative environments. 65 This is a cause for
hope among devotees of public reason. In any case, regardless of
whether public reason's sensitivity to small minorities is on balance
helpful or harmful to its proponents, it certainly makes public reason's
success (or failure) more contingent and idiosyncratic than either its
supporters or the conventional model of public goods would have
imagined.
165. See Joyce Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, 10 GAMES &
EcoN. BEHAVIOR 122, 137 (1994).
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